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On April 14, 1959, the United States Information Agency issued a patriotic 
poster in the Philippines commemorating the anniversary of the Battle of 
Bataan. “Seventeen years ago today,” it read, “Filipino and American soldiers…
heroically fought side by side to preserve the common ideals of freedom and 
democracy.”1 This message was surrounded by imagery invoking a sense of 
brotherhood between the two nations – American and Filipino flags waving 
proudly side-by-side, photographs of marching troops clad in full regalia, and 
the decorated caskets of soldiers from both sides.2 With these mixed images of 
glory, loss, and camaraderie, the United States sought to remind Filipino citi-
zens of the Battle of Bataan in order to “rekindle in our hearts the significance 
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”3 In examining the historical con-
text of this poster, its underlying message becomes clear: by commemorating 
a battle that, although technically a major loss, inspired collaboration with the 
U.S. and the defense of American values such as democracy and freedom, the 
United States hoped to preserve its increasingly strained relationship with the 
Philippines in the wake of communist threats, nationalist fervor, and social 
unrest that emerged in the late 1950s. 
The Battle of Bataan was fought between allied Filipino and American forces 
against the Japanese during the beginning phases of World War II in the 
Pacific. On December 24, 1941, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur declared 
the Philippine capital, Manila, a demilitarized open city and began to with-
draw his troops to the narrow peninsula of Bataan as a defensive strategy. 
1 “Bataan Day Poster – 1959,” April 14, 1959, The National Archives Catalog,
 https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6948935?q=*:*Bataan#.Vmfnara8Da8.link.
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid.
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Despite the region’s geographic disadvantages (it was essentially a cul-de-sac 
that trapped MacArthur’s forces), Bataan possessed a rugged countryside ide-
al for defense, in addition to stockpiled ammunition, medical supplies, and 
provisions that MacArthur had gathered in preparation for a siege.4 These 
provisions proved to be inadequate; however, and soldiers were forced to live 
on half-rations that barely kept them from starvation. On January 9, 1942, 
Japanese forces under General Homma Masaharu attacked Bataan in what 
they assumed would prove an easy victory, but MacArthur’s troops managed 
to neutralize this first attack after a month of fighting. On March 11, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to evacuate the Philippines, 
leaving command of his troops to Maj. General Jonathan Wainwright. Wain-
wright realized the situation was hopeless, as his troops were near starvation 
and the promised aid had not arrived. When the Japanese re-launched their 
attack on April 3rd, Wainwright commanded a predictably futile counteroffen-
sive before his front-line commander, Maj. Gen. Edward King, surrendered 
on April 9th rather than witness the senseless slaughter of his men.5
The tragedy of Bataan was far from over. After King’s surrender, 78,000 Fil-
ipino and American soldiers became prisoners of the Japanese, who forced 
them to march approximately sixty miles to a captured American prison 
camp in what became known as the Bataan Death March.6 The Death March 
was the result of four major conditions: the weak physical state of American 
and Filipino troops, the unpreparedness of the Japanese to receive them, the 
“contempt” in which Japan’s military held its prisoners, and the “cruelty and 
callousness” of the average Japanese soldier.7 Soldiers were forced to march 
continuously through hot and hostile jungle terrain, denied food and water, 
routinely beaten, and executed for collapsing or falling behind, among other 
forms of horrific abuse. Because the ancient Japanese warrior code, known 
4 Alan Axelrod and Jack A. Kingston, Encyclopedia of World War II (New York: Facts on File, 2007), sv. 
“Bataan, Fall of,” 152.
5 Ibid. 
6 Axelrod and Kingston, 150. 
7 Stanley L. Falk, introduction to Bataan Death March: A Survivor’s Account, by William E. Dyess (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2002), ix. 
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as Bushido, regarded surrender as dishonorable, such mistreatment was con-
doned and even encouraged against prisoners. General Homma was later tried 
for war crimes after his surrender to the U.S. in 1945, but not without ruth-
lessly claiming the lives of between 7,000 and 10,000 Filipino and American 
soldiers lost in battle.8 The Battle of Bataan, therefore, resulted not only in 
defeat, but also in a sizeable and tragic loss of life.
The Battle of Bataan was a military defeat of spectacular proportions – an 
unnecessary tragedy born from overconfidence and carelessness.9 Why then, 
would the U.S. seek to rekindle this memory in the Philippines? Despite the 
fact that Bataan was technically a failure, it served a far more complex symbol-
ic value within the historical memory of both Filipinos and Americans. The 
soldiers at Bataan, although technically part of the U.S. Army, were in reality 
over eighty-five percent Filipino. Despite the disadvantages of youth, poor 
training, and inadequate supplies, these men willingly went to war against the 
Japanese alongside the U.S. to protect their shared values of liberty and hap-
piness.10 For Filipinos, the Battle of Bataan was not only a physical struggle; 
it also represented an ideological battle against Japanese Occupation and its 
resulting hardship and oppression. According to Antonio Nieva, a Filipino 
Bataan veteran and survivor of the Death March, in the years of WWII the 
Battle of Bataan represented an “unofficial yet very real national shrine in 
the hearts of the Filipinos,” and even in defeat, its soldiers were regarded as 
a “personification of valor.”11 Thus, the Battle of Bataan entered the canon 
of historical memory as a testament of bravery, freedom, and democracy. In 
his article on the Philippine experience of WWII, Ricardo José discusses the 
nuances of historical memory and how past events such as Bataan are remem-
bered within the shifting narratives of past and present. According to José, 
war memories are determined more by one’s present-day perceptions rather 
8 Axelrod and Kingston, 151. 
9 Donald J. Young, The Battle of Bataan: A Complete History ( Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2009), 5-6. 
10 Young, 6, 9. 
11 Antonio A. Nieva, The Fight for Freedom: Remembering Bataan and Corregidor (Quezon City, Philippines: 
New Day, 1997), ix. 
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than shadows of the past.12 In 1959, therefore, when the United States issued 
a commemorative poster marking the anniversary of the Battle of Bataan, 
they chose to remember the battle not as a defeat, but as a poignant symbol of 
brotherhood between the Philippines and America, when these two nations 
came together to defend their common values of freedom and democracy.13 In 
1959, preserving and promoting such an image became critical in the wake of 
social unrest and anti-U.S. sentiments that emerged in the Philippines. 
The first major period of turmoil prior to 1959 was the Huk Rebellion – two 
separate peasant-based struggles against foreign involvement in the Philip-
pines.14 The first phase of this movement began in 1942, when officers of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) and peasant guerillas from Cen-
tral Luzon established the People’s Anti-Japanese Liberation Army, or Huk-
balahap, to organize resistance against Japanese Occupation.15 By the middle 
of 1942, 625,800 Japanese soldiers were stationed in the Philippines, where 
they controlled the population through propaganda, forced labor, starvation, 
torture, and other violations of basic human rights.16 The Filipino Huk cam-
paign, combined with U.S. military aid, proved successful in overthrowing 
their oppressors, and Japan surrendered to the Allies on September 2, 1945.17 
The second phase of the Huk Rebellion took a more sinister turn towards the 
United States. On January 4, 1946, the U.S. established the Philippine Re-
public, which reinforced its colonial relationship with the Philippines under 
the guise of granting independence. Reluctant to abandon its interests in the 
Pacific, the U.S. persuaded Philippine leaders to accept postwar aid in return 
for permitting the establishment of military bases and parity rights for Amer-
12 Ricardo T. José, “War and Violence, History and Memory: The Philippine Experience of the Second 
World War,” in Contestations of Memory in Southeast Asia, ed. Roxana Waterson and Kwok Kian-Woon (Sin-
gapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012), 186. 
13 “Bataan Day Poster.”
14 Vina A. Lanzona, Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 6. 
15 Ibid., 37. 
16 Ibid., 32. 
17 Ibid., 37. 
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ican companies operating freely in the country.18 In order to create a sense of 
normalcy, therefore, the new state “restored prewar political and economic in-
stitutions that reinforced Philippine dependence on the US in economic, po-
litical, and military terms.”19 The Huks responded to these oppressive attempts 
to restore pre-war land arrangements by reorganizing under a new name – the 
People’s Liberation Army, or HMB – and mobilizing the peasantry to fight 
against imperial influence once more.20 The HMB was formed, according to 
the party, “by the people because of the people,” with the aim of resisting the 
American imperialists and the feudal policies that had led to the suffering of 
millions of farmers.21 They rapidly gained support from 1946-1950, eventually 
increasing their number to twenty thousand armed soldiers.22 
Besides posing a direct threat to their presence, the Huk rebellion was par-
ticularly unsettling to the U.S. because the movement’s history was heavily 
influenced by Communism – a highly concerning detail given existing Cold 
War anxieties.23 Most of the Huk leaders were also high-ranking PKP lead-
ers, communist ideology was circulated among its followers, and their prac-
tical goals, such as extension of land ownership and a larger share of the crop 
among peasants, were exemplary of such an ideology.24 To Americans and the 
closely entwined Philippine government, this promise of a communist society 
not only explained the success of the movement – it represented a significant 
threat to the political order.25 With the rise of communism in China and 
Vietnam, the U.S. became determined to staunch its spread to the Philippines, 
which, because of the rapidly growing strength of the HMB, was seen as “the 
weakest link in their Asian offshore island of defense.”26 Consistent with Cold 
18 Lanzona., 79. 
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 77. 
21 Ibid., 82. 
22 Ibid., 7. 
23 Ibid., 80. 
24 Ibid., 80, 82. 
25 Lanzona, 82. 
26 Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past (Quezon City, 
Philippines: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), 223. 
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War policy, therefore, the Philippine and U.S. governments demonized the 
Communist Party and began instating a military program to defeat the reb-
els.27 
As part of their plan to reinstate power over the Philippines, the U.S. helped 
install Ramon Magsaysay to the presidency on December 30, 1953. In return 
for this aid, Magsaysay served as a political puppet for the U.S., vowing to 
protect American investment interests in the Philippines and smother the 
rising tide of nationalism.28 By the late 1950s, he had fulfilled their joint goal 
of suppressing the Huks through land reform programs and military repres-
sion.29 He also approved efforts to protect American economic interests in 
the Philippines, such as safeguarding trade and investment privileges.30 All 
seemed to be going relatively well for the U.S., until March 17, 1957, when 
Magsaysay died in an accidental plane crash, and the conservative Naciona-
lista candidate Carlos P. Garcia won the subsequent election. 31 Unlike other 
Philippine presidents, Garcia owed nothing to the U.S. for his election, and 
was thus independent-minded rather than loyal to the Americans.32 Further-
more, he was sympathetic to the Filipino nationalist movement. Within a 
few months of his installment, Garcia had instituted a number of policies 
that deeply troubled American authorities, the most important of which was 
an economic resolution known as the Filipino First policy. On August 21, 
1958, the Philippine National Economic Council adopted a resolution which 
“[encouraged] Filipinos to engage in enterprises and industries vital to the 
economic growth, stability, and security of the country,” with the eventual 
goal of attaining a “substantial share of the commerce and industry of the 
country.”33 The American media responded to this threat by issuing a propa-
27 Lanzona, 7. 
28 William J. Pomeroy, The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Resistance! (New York: International, 
1992), 210. 
29 Lanzona, 7. 
30 Pomeroy, 209. 
31 Ibid., 215, 217. 
32 Ibid., 217. 
33 Pomeroy, 217-218. 
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ganda campaign against Garcia. Time and Life magazines, for example, both 
of which were widely circulated in the Philippines, depicted the president as a 
“nonentity who had stepped into the man-sized shoes of the Philippine Na-
tional Hero Ramon Magsaysay.”34 In addition, a U.S. News and World Report 
published in February 27, 1959 attacked the Filipino First policy as “extreme 
nationalism” and indistinguishable from communist propaganda.35 Ironically, 
therefore, the U.S. fear of Filipino nationalism that emerged during the Cold 
War had strengthened the very force that it sought to suppress.
In examining the historical context of early 1959, it becomes clear what message 
the U.S. hoped to achieve by commemorating the seventeenth anniversary of 
the Battle of Bataan. In the time this poster was produced, the Philippines was 
in a state of political and social upheaval. The nationalist policies of President 
Carlos Garcia and the communist uprising of the HMB posed a severe threat 
to U.S. interests in the Philippines, especially when combined with Cold War 
anxieties. By the time the Cold War deepened, Filipinos had grown increasing-
ly disillusioned with the United States. Instead of viewing the U.S. as allies who 
had fought beside them to overthrow Japanese oppression, Americans were 
increasingly depicted as “selfish imperialists” who had plunged the Philippines 
into war to serve their own interests and promote their own ideals of freedom 
and democracy.36 The commemoration of the Battle of Bataan during this trou-
bled time is an example of the purposeful manipulation of historical memory 
– the remembrance of one story rather than another.37 By promoting Bataan 
as a symbol of Filipino-American unity and sacrifice, such propaganda down-
played the empty promises of aid and selfish errors of MacArthur that resulted 
in defeat; instead, it served to strengthen Filipino faith in the United States.38 
In the wake of growing communist and nationalist insurgence, bolstering such 
faith was imperative to maintaining ties between the U.S. and the Philippines. 
34 Ibid., 219. 
35 Ibid.
36 José, 187. 
37 Roxana Waterson and Kwok Kian-Woon, Contestations of Memory in Southeast Asia (Singapore: National 
University of Singapore Press, 2012), 2. 
38 Constantino, 50-51. 
43
Solange Kiehlbauch
In reality, however, this goal was far more nuanced, for the Bataan-Corregidor 
defense created a legend not of American-Filipino unity but of Filipino loy-
alty to the U.S.39 Despite its noble front, American involvement in the Philip-
pines was based not on protecting the interests of the Filipino people, but on 
“preserving U.S. interests that Filipinos were expected to defend.”40 The 1959 
poster commemorating the seventeenth Battle of Bataan is a prime example 
of this pseudo-brotherhood. By promoting the united defense of freedom and 
democracy, this poster sought to bolster Filipino support of the U.S. in order 
to preserve their own interests during in the upsurge of nationalist fervor that 
threatened to loosen their control. 
The Battle of Bataan holds a complicated legacy within the shifting canon of 
historical memory. Although Bataan was technically a defeat with sizeable and 
tragic losses, it emerged as a symbol of brotherhood between the U.S. and the 
Philippines as they united in defense of freedom and democracy. The 1959 
poster commemorating the seventeenth anniversary of Bataan capitalizes on 
this legacy, highlighting the courage, unity, and common values of soldiers from 
both nations. Promoting this idealized image of U.S.-Filipino relations became 
necessary during the Cold War, when the foreign threat of communism spread 
to the Philippines during the Huk Rebellion. When Huk insurgents turned 
against the increasingly imperialistic United States during the second phase of 
the rebellion, Americans became especially alarmed. The rise of nationalist sen-
timent and anti-U.S. policies during the Garcia administration only furthered 
this anxiety. As part of their attempt to bolster their relations and preserve their 
interests in the Philippines, the U.S. issued propaganda such as this poster to 
remind Filipinos of their former unity and common sacrifice. By memorial-
izing the Battle of Bataan as a noble campaign where Filipino and American 
soldiers marched together in defense of freedom, the United States hoped to 
utilize historical memory as a tool to preserve their continued presence in the 
Philippines. 
39 Pomeroy, 107. 
40 Ibid. 
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